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NOTICE TO QUIT.
The rule is that the necessity of a notice to
quit is based on the relation of landlord and.
tenant, and where that relation does not ex-
ist, the notice to quit is not necessary. I
Therefore, it has been held that a mortgagor
in possession, is not entitled to rotice to quit,
as he is "at most a tenant at sufferance, and
may bQ treated either as a tenant or tresposs-
er, at the election of the mortgagee.' '2 And
no notice to quit is necessary where one has
taken possession under an adverse claim. 
So, where the tenant going into possession of
the premises under the title of the landlord,
afterwards disclaims, he has no right to insist
on a notice to quit.4 At common law, a ten-
ant at sufferance was not entitled to notice to
quit.5  But it has been provided by statute in
some of. the States, that it shall be necessary
to serve him with notice to quit. It is so pro-
vided in Missouri, where one month's notice
is required,6 and in Wisconsin.7 But in Mich-
igan, 8 and in Oregon, 9 the statute iequires a
notice of three months. This provision, re-
quiring notice to be given to tenants at suf-
ferance, has given rise to some troublesome
questions. In considering this provision in a
recent case in Michigan, that court said:
1 Thackeral.v. Cheeseman, 3 Harr. (15 N. J. L.) 1,
8; Baly v. Hickman's Heirs, Lit. Sel. Cases (Ky.),
266; Chamberlin v. Donahue. 45 Vt. 50, 55; Kilburn
v. R tchie, 2 Cal. 145; Den v. Webster, 18 Tenn. (10
Yer.) 512; Eberwine v. Cook, 74 Ind. 377; Indianapo-
)is Manuf. Co. v. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 45 Ind. 281;
-Neeker v. Doe, 7 Blackf. 169.
2 Den v. Wade, 20 N. J, Law, 291, 294; Den v. Stock-
ton, 12 N. J. Law, 322; Pierce v. Brown, 24 Vt. 15,
171; Allen v. Carpenter. 15 Mich. 25, 34.
S Williams v. Hensley, 1 Mar. (Ky.) 181.
4 Bates v. Austin, 2 Mar. (Ky.) 217; Ross v. Garri-
son, 1 Dana (Ky.), 86; Tuttle v. Reynolds, 1 Vt. 80;
Clapp v. Beardsley, Ib. 151; Chamberlin v. )onahue,
451Vt. 50; Bolton v. Landers, 27 Cal. 104; Smith v.
Shaw, 16 Cal. 68; Woodward v. Brown, 13 Pet. 1;
Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 43,48; Stephens v. Brown,
56 Mo. 23; Kunzie v. Wixom, 30 Mich. 384; Fuller v.
Sweet, 30 Mich. 237; Miller v. Shackleford, 4 Dana
(Ky.), 278; Emerick v. Tavener, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 220;
Harrison v. Middleton, 11 Gratt. (Va.) 527: Allen v.
Paul, 24 Gratt. (Va.) 382; Harrison v. Marshall, 4
Bibb. (Ky.) 524; Den v. Blair, 15 2N. J. Law, 181; Me-
Clane v. White, 5 Minn. 178; Chilton v. Niblett, 22
Tenn. 404; Lane v. Osment, 17 Tenn. (9 Yer.) 86, 90;
Smith v. Shaw, 16 Cal. 18.
6 Alien v. Carpenter, 15 Mich. 25, 42; Reed v. Reed,
48Me. 888.
6 Rev. Stat. (1879), vol. 1, p. 514, sec. 3078.
7 Rev. Stat. (1878), p. 629, sec. 2183.
Compiled Laws (1871), p. 8165 (4304).
u Laws (1843-1872), p. 688, see. 348,
"We shall not undertake to determine in this
case, exactly what is meant by the statute
above referred to, in giving to tenants at suf-
ferance a right to the same notice to surren-
der possession as is given to tenants at will;
but we do not think a tenant who wrongfully
holds over for a short time, becomes immedi-
ately entitled to suoh notice, or that any short
delay in commencing proceedings against him
can confer the right. The statute evidently
intends a case of a holding where the occu-
pant has some equities which would render it
unjust that lie be required to surrender imme-
diate possession; but he can not acquire such
equities by a mere wrongful holding over,
which is neither assented to nor acquiesced
in." -10 It was conceded that he would, with-
out doubt, have been entitled to notice as a
tenant at will, if he had held over by the ex-
press or implied consent of his landlord.
In the previous case of Allen v. Carpen-
ter,11 the same court was called on to deter-
mine whether, under this statute, a mortgagor
holding over after foreclosure of the mort,
gage, would be entitled, to notice to quit un-
der the provisions of this same statute. *Unde'r
the ciicumstances of the case, the court was
equally divided in opinion. Mr. Justice Camp-
bell, in an opinion in7 which Mr. Chief Justice
Martin concurred, maintained that it was not
such a tenancy as required notice to terminate
it; while Mr. Justice Cooley, Mr.. Justice
Christiancy concurring, maintained that no-
tice was necessary, stress being laid on the
fact that it was unjust ttha a tenant should be
dispossessed as a wrong-doer wIthout warn-
ing, when he was not guilty of intentional
wrong, and perhaps not even aware that he
was not holding in his own right. Mr. Jus-
tice Cooley declaxed "that whenever the oc-
cupant continues to hold by the consent of
the owner, he becomes entitled to notice as
tenant at will; and that where the owner suf-
fers him to remain in possession without ob-
jection, and to make such use of the premises
as would render it unjust to demand and en-
force possession against him without warning;
this laches of the owner entitles him to the
statutory notice as tenant at sufferance.
There is no wrong and no hardship in this to
any one, and it seems to me to accomplish the
purpose of the statute.
10 Benfey v. Congdon, 40 Mich. 283, 286,
1 15 Mich. 25.
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The Supreme Court of New York was called
on to give construction to a similar statute, in
the case of Rowan v. Lytle, 12 decided in 1834.
It was there held that a tenant for a year,
holding over after the expiration of his term
without the permission of his landlord, was
not a tenant at sufferance within the meaning
of the statute. In this case, Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Savage declared: "An estate at suffer-
ance is an estate created, not by the consent,
but by the laches of the owner. It seems to
follow that without laches on the part of the
owner or landlord, there can be no estate at
sufferance. * * * * But for the pur-
pose of giving this statute a fair construction
and beneficial operation, no notice should be
held necessary, unless the landlord has un-
necessarily delayed his proceedings; and the
object of the legislature will be best promoted
by holding that such notice is not necessary,
unless the landlord has permitted the tenancy
at sufferance to continue for such a length of
time as toimply assent. * * * * Under
the circumstances of this case, a delay, to be
justly called a laches, must be of longer con-
tinuance than three months (the time which
elapsed between the end of the year and the
commencement of these proceedings), and
should, I apprehend, be accompanied with
some evidence of negligence. In this case it
appears the landlord endeavored to obtain
possession without a resort to coercive pro-
ceedings, but was unsuccessful." Afterwards,
in Livingston v. Tanner,' 3 a tenant per autre
vie, who had held over for nearly four months,
without, so far as appeared, any knowledge
that his estate had terminated, was entitled to
notice under this statute, on the ground that
it would be unjust, under the circumstances
of the case, to dispossess him without warn-
ing.
The tenant is likewise not entitled to any
notice to qtit in those cases where his lease
is for a fixed and certain period, at the expi-
ration of which it is by its own terms to deter-
mine. 14 Under a statutory provision in Ken-
12 11 Wend. 617.
13 12 Barb. 481.
14 Decker v. Adams, 12 N. J. Law, 99; Steffens v.
Earl, 40 N. J. Law, 133; Alien v; Jaynish, 21 Wend.
628; Jackson v. Parkhurst, 5 Johns. 128; Logan v
Herron, 8 S. & R. 460; Bedford v. M'Elherron, 2 S. &
R. 49; Lesley V. Randolph, 4 Rawle, 126; Boggs v.
Black, 1 Bion. 335; Young v. Smith, 28 Mo. 65; Al-
tucky, the rule in that State is, that where a
tenant holds for a year or more, under a lease
to expire on a day certain, and the tenant
holds over, he may be expelled without notice
any time within ninety days. If, however,
proceedings are not instituted within that
time, none are allowed until the expiration of
one year from the day the term or tenancy
expired. And at the end of that time he is
bound to quit without notice. 15
Whether a tenant at will is entitled to
notice to quit, is a question which has
given rise to considerable discussion. There
are several cases which maintain that a
tenant at will is even better entitled to
six months notice to quit. 16 These must be
regarded, however, as tenancies at will from
year to year, and not as the strict tenancy at
will, as we understand it at the present time.
In Ellis v. Paige, the Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts decided, but not by a unanimous
opinion, that a strict tenant at will was not
entitled to notice to quit.' 7 But in a subse-
quent case in the same court, Parker, C. J.,
spoke of the necessity of notice in such cases
as being still an open and unsettled question.'
In this state of the matter, the legislature.
stepped in and put an end to the controversy
by providing that a notice should be required.
This case of Ellis v. Paige has, however, been
generally regarded as laying down the correct
rule in such cases. 19
The questioa arises, whether a servant, who
has had given to him, as an incident to his
employment, the right to occupy a tenement
upon the premises of his employer, is entitled
to a notice to quit upon the dissolution of the
relation of master and servant. Has a laborer
a right to insist updn a notice to quit, who,
by the terms of his agreement, has the pos-
session of a house of his employer, for which
corn v. Morgan, 77 Ind. 184; Harriet v. Lawrence, 2
Mar. 366. McClure v. McClure, 74 Ind. 108.
15 Mendel v. Hall, 13 Bush, 233.
16 Parker v. Constable, 3 Wils. 25; Jackson v. Bry-
an, 1 Johns. 322; Jackson v. Laughhead. 2 Johns. 755;
Jackson v. Wheeler, 6 Johns. 271. And see Putnam,
J., upon Ellis v. Page, 1 Pick. 43, reported 2 Pick. 71.
17 1 Pick. 43.
18 Coffin v. Lunt, 2 Pick. 71.
19 Davis v. Thompson, 13 Me. 209, 214; Moore v.
Boyd, 24 Me. 243; Withers v. Larrabee, 48 Ale. 578;
Gordon v. Gilman, 48 Me. 473; Esty v. Baker, 50 Me.
825; Van Allen v. Rogers, 2 Caine's Cas. 314; s. C., 1
Johns. Cas. 33; Van Denberg v. Bradt, 2 Caines, 169;
Van Cortlandt v. Parkhurst, 5 Johns. 128; Currier v.
Perley, 24 N. H. 219, 228, Rich v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 67.
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-he pays n6 specified rent, but makes compen-
.sation therefor by rec6iving less wages than
he would receive if he occupied a house of
his own? "Many servants," says Chief Jus-
•tice Mansfield, "have houses given them to
live in, as porters at park gates. If a master
turns away his servant, does it follow that he
-can not evict him until the end of the year?"
He thought not. 20  So, in Kentucky, where a
farmer employed a laborer for a year at a
.stipulated price,, and agreed to furnish him a
-house at so much per month, the court held
that upon ceasing to labor, his tenancy deter-
mined, being nothing more than a tenancy at
will, and he was not entitled to any notice to
quit. 21 So, in New Jersey, where a workman
was employed by the month, and had the use
of a house for himself and his family as part
of his compensation, the court held that the
xelation between them was not that of land-
lord and tenant, but of master and servant,
.and that no notice to quit was necessary.
22
And in the same State, where one was em-
vcloyed as a lock tender, and as a part of his
compensation was permitted to occupy one of
,the dwelling houses of the company adjoining
the lock, the court held he was not entitled
,to the three months' notice to quit required
by statute. 2  In a case in New York, Chief
.Justice Church, speaking for the Court of Ap-
I)eals, said: "Where the occupation of a
house by a servant is connected with the ser-
.ice, or is required by the employer for the
,.necessary or better performance of the ser-
vice, the occupation is as servant, not as
,tenant, and the possession is that of the mas-
ter. * * * * The question depends on
he nature of the holding, whether it is exclu-
6ive and independent of,- and in no way con-
nected with the service, or whether it is so
-connected or is necesssary for its perform-
ance. " 21
An important and interesting case involv-
ing. the question we are considering, was
recently decided in the Supreme Court of
'indiar . The question there was whether
a Runtin Catholic priest, who was subject to
,be removed at the pleasure of the bishop hav-
dng charge over him, was entitled to a notice
0 King v. Storck, 2 Taunt. 339.
A1 McGee v. UibsS)n, I B. Mon. 105.
'2 McQuade v. Eininons, 38 N. J. Law, 39.
'23 .Mor.-is Callna Co. v. Mitchell, 31 N. J. Law, 100.
"24 Kerraius v. People, 60 N. Y. 221.
to quit the parsonage. We feel warranted
in transcribing a portion of the opinion
of the court as follows: "While it may
not be said upon the facts of the com-
plaint that the defendant was the hired serv-
ant of his bishop, it does appear that he was
appointed to his position by, and held it at the
discretion of, the bishop, and that his pos-
session of the. property was only an incident
to his appointment, the better to enable him
to discharge the duties of his office; and
when in the exercise of that discretion, which
by the rules and customs of the church he
had the right to employ, the bishop removed
the defendant from his charge or'pastorate
over the congregation, his right to possession
of the property at once necessarily ceased.
If, under the circumstances, the parties
should be deemed to have oome under a con-
tract relative to each other, the plain fhean-
ing of the contract was, that when the de-
fendant should cease to be pastor, which
might be at the will of his bishop, he should
cease forthwith to occupy the property, there
being from the nature of the case no right of
occupancy, except as an incident to the per-
formance of the duties of pastor. And if
this be regarded as a tenancy, it was a tenan-
cy at will, and determined by one month's
notice in writing delivered to the tenant,
which notice the complaint shows to have
been given. We are, however, of the opinion
that the relation of the parties was more like
that of master and servant, the possession of
the priest being, in fact, the possession of
his superior, the bishop, who had power at
any time, and upon his own judgment or dis-
cretion, to remove one and install another in
the office of pastor, and in the possession of
the property of the office." 25 There seems
to be no doubt upon the authorities that
where the relation of master and servant ex-
ists between the parties, and the servant oc-
cupies a house as an incident to his employ-
ment, he is not entitled to notice to quit.
26
As between vendor and vendee, where the ven-
dee has been let into possession of the prem-
ises under a contract of purchase, which he
has failed to comply with, the rule must be
regarded as settled that such vendee is not
26 Chatard v. O'Donovan, 21 Am. Law Reg. 461,
26 Haywood v. Miller, 8 Hill (N. Y.), 90; People v.
Annis, 45 Barb. 301; Doyle v. G~bbs, 6 Lans. 180;
Comstock v. Dodge, 43 How. Pr. 97.
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entitled to notice to qa'XtY Where a stranger
to the owner, on his behalf and in his name,
makes a lease of his property and the lessee
has entered into possession under it, such
lessee is not entitled to any notice to quit
from the owner of the premises.2s  And
where no rent had been paid for twenty Years
before action brought, it was held that the
jury had a right to presume that the relation
of landlord ar.d tenant had ceased, and that
no notice to quit was necessary. 29 Where
the tenant held over for two years, but with-
-out recognition from nie landlord, waa held
not to be entitled to notice to quit.3 0 In a
case in Kentucky it was held that if a suit for
the possession of land was dismissed for the
want of notice, in a subsequent aftion for
the same premises the former suit will be re-
garded as dispensing with the necessity of no-
tice to terminate the tenancy, which was a
tenancy from year to year.2 ' And it has been
held that no notice was necessary to the un-
der tenants.3 2 In a case in California it was
held that where a notice to quit was served
on the original lessee, the notice bound an
under tenant, who acquired possession from
the tenant after its service.33 While in a case
in New York the court held that a notice to
quit given by the lessor to his immediate les-
see who had continued to pay the rent was
sufficient, although another was in possession
of the premises. 3 - Where a parol agreement
provided for the renting of premises for one
month, and for each successive month there-
after until the landlord should want the prem-
ises for his own use, when the tenancy was to
expire, it was held that this could not be con-
sidered as a tenancy at will or by sufferance.
"It was an agreement," said the court, "for
an indefinite number of months, subject to
be terminated by a notice from the landlord
that he wanted the premises. Under such an
agreement the statutory notice of thirty days
27 Den V. Webster, 1 Tenn. 512; Chilton v. 5iblett,
22 Tenn. 404; Glascock v. Robards, 14 Mo. 850; Den
v. Westbrook, 15 N. J. Law, 371; Van Valkenbergh v.
Rahway Bank, 23 N. J. Law, 583; fRoss v. Van Aulen,
42 N. J. Law, 49.
28 Yellow Jacket Silver Mining Co. v. Stevenson, 5
Nev. 233.
29 Crow her v. Lloyd, 31 N. J. Law, 395.
30 Den v. SnowhIll, 23 N. J. Law, 448.
ai Corneillson V. Corneillson, 1 Bush. 153.
32 Roe v. Wiggs, 5 B. & P. 330.
33 Schilling v. Holmes, 23 Cal. 227.
01 Livingston v. Baker, 10 Johns. 270.
to a tenant at will or at ufferarnce, Vws not
necessary." 5 Where a landlord sent to his
tenant already in possession of the premises,
written permission to remain two years longer
free of rent, and tenant continued in posses-
sion without informing the landlord that he
declined the terms offered, it was held that he
would be deemed to have accepted them, and
that upon the expiration of the term he could
be dispossessed without notice to quit.
36
"The writing," the court said, 'could be con-
strued as a notice to quit after the expiration
of thetwyers."
The rule requiring notice to quit to be
served on the tenant, being for the benefit of
the tenant, he is of course at liberty in his
written lease to waive his right by an express
agreement to that effect.37 And when a land-
lord has once served notice to quit, his subse-
quent conduct may amount to a waiver of it.
In Lucas v. Btooks,3S the Supreme Court of
the United States considered the question of
the waiver of a notice to quit. In a pro;
ceeding in forcible detainer, the notice to
lciit, ,hiot & %ae the foundation of the %Uit,
was served in March, 1867, and required the
premises to be surrendered in April, 1868.
But there was evidence that a distress war-
rant was afterwards issued upon the affidavit
of one representing himself to be the agent
of the landlord, for rent sworn to be due for
rent for the year ending April 1, 1871, which
had been levied on the property of the de-
fendant, who had given a forthcoming bond,
the matter being still pending, This, it was
contended, constitutes a waiver of the notice
to quit, and entitled the defendant to a ver-
dict. On this question Mr. Justice Strong
remarked: "It is true the notice to quit might
have been waived, and doubtless should have
been regarded as waived by the distress war-
rant if it had been issued by the plaintiff, or
by his authority. But waiver is always in
part a question of intent, and there could
have been no intent to waive if the act
claimed to have been a waiver was either un-
known to the plaintiff, or unauthorized by
him, or not ratified by him." The court be-
low had charged that if notice to quit was
35 People v. Schackno, 48 Barb. 551; People v. Goe-
let, 64Ib. 476; s. c., 14 Akbb. Pr. (N. S.) 130 Wood-
row v. 'Michael, 13 Mich. 187.
i6 Hulett v. Nugent, 71 Mo. 132.
87 Hutchinson v. Potter, 11 Pa. St. 472.
88 18 Wall., 436, 455.
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given, and afterwards a distress warrant was
sued out to recover the rent, the presumption
of law would be that it was sued out with the
assent of the plaintiff, in which event he
could not maintain the action unless the evi-
dence satisfied the jury that the agent ex-
ceeded his authority. And it is held that the
receipt of subsequently accruing rent is a
waiver of the notice to quit.3 9 As to the
length of time before the expiration of the
tenancy, that it was necessary to give the no-
tice to quit, it is, of course, well understood
that in tenancies from year to year the rule
required a six months' notice to be given.
40
But in the case of tenancies for periods run-
ning less than a year, a different rule gov-
erned. By analogy the rule requiring a six
months notice in tenancies from year to year,
would only make necessary a half month's or
a half week's notice in the case of monthly
or weekly tenancies. But this analogy was
not observed. Monthly and weekly tenancies
were so brief that it was probably considered
unwise to require merely a half month's no-
tice or a half week's. Hence, in the case of
tenancies running for periods of less than a
year, the notice was regulated by the letting,
and was equivalent to a period. Where the
letting was for a quarter, it was necessary to
give a quarter's notice,41 and in the case of
monthly lettings, a monthly notice, 42 while in
the case of weekly tenancies a week's notice
was considered essential. 43 But by an agree-
ment of the'parties the length of time required
for the notice could be varied, and might be
limited to end on a particular day or time.44
However, if it was not otherwise agreed on,
it was necessary that the notice to quit should
39 Prindle v. Anderson, 19 Wend. 391; s. C., 23
Wend. 616.
40 Right v. Darby, 1 Term, 159, 162, 163; Johnston
v. Huddleston, 4 B. & C. 922; Parker v. Constable, 3
Wils. 25, Gullivar v. Burr, 1 W. Bl. 596; Jackson v.
Hughes, 1 Blackf. (Ind.) 421, 427; Hanchett v. W it-
ney, 2 Ark. 241; S. C., 1 Vt. 311; Barlow v. Wain-
wright, 22 Vt. 88; Hall v. Wadsworth, 28 Vt. 410;
Silsby v. Allen, 43 Vt. 172; Hall v. Myers, 43 Md. 449;
Ross v. Garrison,1l Dana, 36; Morehead v. Watkyns,
5 B. Mon, 229; Currier v. Perley, 4 Foster (N. H.),
219, 224.
41 Kemp v. Derrett, 8 Camp. 510.
42 Parry v. Hazel], 1 Esp. 94; Roe v. Raffan, 6 Esp.
Cas.; Doe v. Scott, 6 Bing. 364; Currier v. Perley, 4
Foster (N. H.), 219, 224.
43 Peacock v. Raff uin, 6 Esp. 4; Campbell v. Scott,
6 Bing. 362.
44 Tyler v. Seed, Skin. R. 649; Doe v. Bell, 5 D. &
E. 471; Doe v. Charnock, Peak.Cas. 4; Currier v. Per-
ley, 4 Foster (N. H.), 219, 226.
terminate with the current period of the year,
or month, or week of the tenancy, as the case
might be. 45 In New Hampshire, under their
statute regulating notices to quit, the courts
hold that the notice to quit may be made to,
quit at any day therein named, instead of the
precise term of a year or period. 46 The
length of the notice to be given is now regu-
lated by statute in most of the States, and
instead of the six months' notice necessary at.
common law, only a three months' notice is
now generally required.' 7 In some of the
States it has been provided that a tenancy at.
will or at' sufferance shall be terminated by
giving notice in writing to quit at a day named
in the notice. 45 And in Illinois a tenancy
from year to year may be terminated upon.
sixty days' notice. 4 9 While in Louisiana, it
is provided that fifteen days' notice shall be
sufficient if no time is fixed in the lease for
its determination.5 0
It is to be observed that a notice to quit, in
order to be valid, should truly state the day
on which the tenancy is to terminate. "If,
therefore," says Mr. Chief Justice Shaw in a
case in Massachusetts, 'a person designate in
his notice a day for the termination of his
tenancy, which is not the day on which the
rent is payable, or a day on which the tenancy
can be legally made to expire by a notice, the
notice is unavailing and the tenancy may still
continue. No one is obliged to regard a no-
tice which fixes a day for the termination of
a lease different from that on which a lease
can be by law made to terminate; such a no-
tice being one that neither party had a right
to give, is treated as a nullity. * * *
It is by no means necessary to name the pre-
45 Right v. Darb-y, I D. & E. 156; Doe v. Bell, 5
D.& E., 471; Roe v. Ward, 1 H. B. 97; Doe v. Dunno-
van, 1 Taunt. 555; Usher v. Moss, 50 Miss. 20R; An-
derson v. Critcher, 11 G. & J. 450; Prescott v. Elm, 7
Cush. 346.
46 Hazeltine v. Colburn, 11 Foster (31 N. H.), 466,
471; Currier v. Perley, 4 Fost. (24 N. H.), 219.
47 Virginia Code (1873), p. 969; sec. 5; West Vir-
ginia Code (1868), p. 526; Colorado Gen. Laws (1877),
p. 474, sec. 1246; Missouri Rev. Stats. (1879), vol. I.,
p. 514, sec. 2077; Minnesota Statutes (1877),. ch. 75, p.
820, sec. 40, Indiana Rev. SLats. (1881), sec. 5209;
Kansas Gen. Stats. (1868), p. 540, see. 5" Pennsyl-
vania Birightly's Purdon's Digest (1700-1872), vol. It.,
p. 880; New Hampshire Gen. Liws (1878), p. 575,
sec. 2; Rhode Island Pub. SLats. (1882), p. 648, see.
2. New Jersey Revision (1709-1877), p. 575, see. 29.
48 New Hampshire Gen. Laws (1878), p. 575, see. 1;
Rhode Island Pub. Stat. (1882), p. 648, see. 1.
49 Rev. Stat. (1874), p. 658, sec. 5.
t0 Revised Code (1870), art. 2686.
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cise day and date on which a tenancy is to
expire, in a notice to quit, but it may be de-
signated in general terms, if stated correct-
ly." 51 HENRY WADE RoGERS.
51 Sanford V. Harvey, llCush. 93.
MISREPRESENTATION AS AFFECTED
BY INTENT.
A misrepresentation, as defined by Bouvier,
is: "The statement made by a party to a
contract that a thing relating to it is in fact
in a particular way, when he knows it is not
so." From this definition, it must be inferred
that a knowledge of the falsity of the state-
ments at the time of making the contract,
must exist in order to allow the person
wronged by such statements to recover for
the damages sustained; and so have some of
the courts held.' But the question of intent
has received such different constructions by
different courts, that it may not be amiss
to give it a little considerption. Sew-
all, J., in Emerson v. Brigham,
2 lays down
the rule in the following words: " The
rule has always been, I believe , that an action
of deceit, or an action on the case for deceit,
in a bargain or trade, is maintainable only,
where the deception complained of has been
intentional on the part of the seller." The
court in this case, quoted Justice Popham,
who states the law thus: "If I have an arti-
cle which is defective, whether victuals or any
thifig else, and I, knowing it to be defective,
sell it as sound, and so represent or affirm it,
an action upon the case lies for the deceit;
but, although it be defective, if that is un-
known to me, although 1 represent or affirm
it to be sound, no action lies, unless I war-
rant it to be sound." 3  In Boyd's Executors
v. Brown, 4 which was an action on the case
for deceit,, arising from false representations
as to the credit of a third person, the court
1 Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 202; Chandelor v.
Lopuis, 2 Croke, 4; Bond v. Clark, 35 Vt. 677; 11tarer
v. Morgan, 51 Barb. 116; Bartholemew v. Benley, 15
Ohio, 6O(,
2 10 Mass. 202.
3 Dyer, 75, in margin.
46 Barr, 310. See, also, Haly v. Tree, 3 T. U. 51;
Foster v. Charles, 6 Bing. 369; Corbit v. Brown, 8
Bing. 33: Allen v. Addington, 7 Wend. 9; Aw.es v.
3Melward, 8 Taunt. 637; Hanar v. Alexander, 5 B. &
P. 241; Vernon v. Keys, 12 East, 631.
said: "The question always was, did the-
defendant knowingly falsify or wilfully sup-
press the truth with a view of giving a third
party a credit to which he was not entitled?"
"If he make representations productive of
loss to another, knowing such represehtations
to be false, he is responsible as for a fraudu-
lent deceit." The conflict that had existed
between the Queen's Bench and the Ex-
chequer was brought to a close by the. decis-
ions of the Exchequer Cftamber in Evans v.
Collins, in 1844, and in Ormrod v. Huth, 5 in
1845. In the latter case, Tindal, C. J., said:
"The rule which is to be derived from all the
cases appears to us to be, that where, upon
the sale of goods, the purchaser is satisfied
without requiring a warranty, he can not re-
cover upon a mere representation of the qual-
ity by the seller, unless le can show that the
representation is bottomed in fraud; but if
the representations were honestly made, and
believed at the time to be true, there is no
fraud, but caveat emptor applies, and the rep-
resentations furnish no ground of action. In
Evans v. Collins, 6 it was held that the gener-
al rule of law is, that fraud must concur
with the false statement in orddr to give a
ground of action. And this, after a series of
decisions on both sides of this question, from
Chandelor v. Lopus, 7 down to the present
time, seems to be the established doctrine in
England. 8 On the other hand, there is as
much conflict on the law relating to this point
in this country as in England. While many
of the States follow the law as established in
England, others take the opposite view, and
hold that an action for damages may be sus-
tained for misrepresentation, even when made
innocently. Cooley, C. J., in Converse v.
Blumrich,9 in speaking of the statements made
by one of the parties, said: "We will not
undertake to say that he did not convince
himself, by some process of reasoning, that
they were correct. But the legal aspect of
the case would not be different, if we came
5 14 M. & W. 651.
6 3 Q. B, &20.
7 2 Croke, 4.
8 Benjamin on Sales, 425; Childers v. Wooler, 2 E. &
E. 287; Childers v. Wooler, 29 L. J. Q. B. 129; Wilde
v. Gibson, 1 IT. L. Cases, 633.
9 14 Mich. 108, citing Ainsley v. MAedleycott, 9 7es.
21: Taylor v. Ashton, 11 31. & W. 401; Smith v. Rich-
ards. 13 Pet. 26; Lockridge v. Foster, 4 Scam. 569;
Smith v. Babcock, 2 Wood & M. 246; Tuthill v. Bab-
cock, 2 Wood & M. 298.
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